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The Market Reaction to Stock Option
Plan Introduction in Japan
By
Yoshiyuki Matsuura
Osaka University, Japan
This study investigates the announcement effect of the introduction
of stock option plans using data from the Japanese market. The
results of the event study analysis show that the announcement
effect is connected with significantly positive abnormal returns,
which is consistent with the agency hypothesis.
INTRODUCTION    
In recent years academic interest in corporate governance has been grow-
ing and there has been a lot of controversy, especially over compensation for
top management.
In Japan, the revision of the Commercial Code in May 1997 enabled the
introduction of stock option plans, which had been prohibited for many years.
This newly-introduced system arouses wide interest as an incentive for man-
agement to show greater respect for shareholders’ profits.  Many companies
have decided to introduce some form of stock options, since it is now support-
ed by the taxation and auditing systems.
In the United States, empirical studies about the reaction of the stock
market to the announcement of the introduction of incentive compensation
have been done by Larcker (1983), Tehranian and Waegelein (1985), Brickley
et al.(1985), Bhagat et al.(1985), DeFusco et al.(1990), Yermack (1997) and so
on.  This research reveals that the stock price rises consistently after the
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announcement.  The use of incentive compensation plans is grounded in agency
theory as firms attempt to align shareholder and management interests by link-
ing mangement rewards to the firm performance.
There have been, however, few empirical studies about Japanese stock
option plans so far.  Therefore here we investigate empirically the influence of
the announcement of the introduction of stock option plans upon share prices,
using the event study methods and taking Japanese companies, which have a
different structure and purpose of corporate governance from US companies.
Japanese corporate governance, as there are a lot of stable shareholders as a
consequence of cross shareholding based on the concept of the main bank or
Keiretsu, companies are inclined to attach major importance to the interest of
management as well as employees, which is far apart from maximizing the
value of their company.  
The remainder of this paper is composed as follows: Section 2 describes
the data for analysis; Section 3 explains the methods of analysis; Section 4 pres-
ents the empirical results; Section 5 concludes this study.  
THE DATA
We examined whether or not there had been any announcement of the
introduction of stock option plans by Japanese companies during the period
from May 1, 1997 to May 31, 1999 using the on-line Nikkei Telecom 21 News
Retrieval Service provided by Nihon Keizai Shinbun.  To extract samples the
following criteria were applied:
(1) Being listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE)
at the time of the announcement.  (Financial institutions and utilities
are excluded);
(2) Daily rates of return being available to permit estimation of the mar-
ket model and no missing days in the event window;
(3) No other significant events related to the company being reported for
the period from 7 days before to 7 days after the announcement.
According to these guidelines, we obtained as a sample 41 companies from 14
industries. 
It is certain that every company that has decided to introduce a system of
stock options makes the announcement at a press conference on the exact date
of the board meeting with newspapers reporting it on the following day.
Therefore, we define Day 0 (the event day) as the day on which a company has
its board meeting and makes the announcement to the press; Day 1 as the day
when the Nihon Keizai Shinbun, a major economic daily paper, carries it. 
The data on stock prices was obtained from the Toyo Keizai stock price
database; the data on management ownership, from the Nikkei NEEDS finan-
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cial database; the details of each form of stock options, and from the compa-
nies’ annual reports. 
METHODOLOGY
Prior studies give some empirical evidence that the announcement of the
introduction of incentive compensation brings positive and statistically signifi-
cant abnormal returns.  Based on this evidence, there is a widely accepted
explanation that abnormal returns are derived from the incentive effects based
on the agency theory.  In an agency perspective of Jensen and Murphy (1990),
the introduction of equity-based compensation such as stock option plans has
incentive effects that enable management to ease confrontation with sharehold-
ers regarding their interest and to be motivated to enhance the value of their
company.  Therefore in prior studies in the United States, it is interpreted that
the market has reacted positively to those incentive contracts. 
With regard to Japanese corporate governance, as there are a lot of stable
shareholders as a consequence of cross shareholding based on the concept of
the main bank or Keiretsu, companies are inclined to attach major importance
to the interest of management as well as employees, which is far apart from
maximizing the value of their company.  
As Kaplan and Minton (1994) point out, Japanese firms generally tend to
give much more priority to long-term performance such as market-share over
short-term objectives like stock prices.
In this study we empirically investigate whether the announcement of the
introduction of stock option plans has a positive influence on stock prices or
not, with the purpose of verifying whether the incentive effect based on the
agency theory exists also in Japan where we have a different style of corporate
governance.  
An event study methodology is used to estimate abnormal returns (ARs)
and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the event day (board meeting
day).  The period of the announcement is set for 3 days before and 3 days after
the board-meeting day, which is the day of the press conference.  The single-
index market model parameters are estimated over the 250 days preceding the
20 days before the event date.  The test statistics are calculated using the
methodology outlined by Bhagat et al.(1985).
RESULTS
The results of the event study are presented in panels A and B of Table 1.
Panel A of Table 1 shows daily abnormal returns (ARs), the associated Z-
scores, and the proportion of firms yielding positive ARs for the period from
day -3 to day +3 around the event date.  Panel B reports corresponding statis-
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tics for the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for various intervals.
(A) The results indicate that the abnormal returns are negative and
insignificant during the 3-day period prior to day 0 (the day of the
press conference following the board meeting).
(B) Day 0 is 0.467 percent and the Z-score of 0.735.  Day +1 (the day of
coverage in the newspapers) is 1.160 percent and the Z-score of
1.825 is significant at the five percent level. 
(C) During the two days around the event announcement (day 0 and +1)
the cumulative abnormal returns are at 1.627% and the Z-score of
1.810 is significant at the five percent level.
Our findings suggest that the market reacts favorably to the announce-
ment of the introduction of stock option plans in Japan. 
The results are consistent with the previous findings, especially those of
Bhagat et al. (1985) and DeFusco et al. (1990) in the case of the United States.  
The purpose is to verify whether management ownership has influence
on the above-mentioned ARs and CARs or not.  In order to achieve this verifi-
cation, we divide all the samples into two groups to make further analysis: one
consists of the companies whose management ownership is high; the other is of
low management ownership companies.
Our theory is that we expect that the market reacts more favorably to the
announcement of the introduction of stock option plans if a company whose
management ownership is low makes that announcement, since their agency
problems are more severe, so that the effect of the introduction of stock options
will be greater.
To investigate this hypothesis, we divide the whole sample into two
groups based on the extent of management ownership with the median being
used as the cut-off point.
Panel A of Table 1 displays results for the management ownership sub-
samples.  Looking at the abnormal returns of day 1, those of the high manage-
ment ownership companies are 0.220 percent (Z=0.232), which is statistically
insignificant.  On the other hand, the corresponding figure of the low manage-
ment ownership companies is 2.054 percent (Z=2.417), which is significant.
The difference of 1.734 percent is significant at conventional levels using the
one-tailed T-test (t=-1.800).
Panel B of Table 1 provides information on CARs for the management
ownership subsamples.  As to the CARs for the interval from day 0 to day 1,
while the companies whose management ownership is high show 0.622 percent
(Z=0.463), the low management ownership companies present 2.584 percent
(Z=2.150).  The difference of 1.962 percent is significant at the 10 percent level
using the one-tailed T-test (t=-1.526).
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These results indicate that the market reacts more favorably to the
announcement made by low management ownership companies than to that of
high management ownership companies. This finding is consistent with the
agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976).  They argue that in companies
whose management ownership is high, the agency problems caused by conflict
between management interests and the shareholders’ interests are reduced.
Consequently, there seldom exists the necessity and the effect of the introduc-
tion of stock option plans.  In contrast, companies whose management owner-
ship is low have severe agency problems because there are some factors in
wasting corporate resources, such as undue expenditure on perquisites and
excessive investment.  In these companies, it is quite effective to introduce
stock option plans as an additional incentive.  Our analysis results are consis-
tent with that theory. 
CONCLUSION
Stock option plans are important contracts that improve the alignment of
management interest and shareholders’ interest.  In Japan, since the authoriza-
tion of stock options, the number of companies adopting the said system has
been increasing in recent years.  By contrast, there have been few empirical
studies done about that system to date.
This study investigates the announcement effects of the introduction of
stock option plans using data from the Japanese market.  The empirical results
indicate that stock prices show a statistically significant response to the
announcement of the introduction of stock options.  We also find that stock
returns react more positively to low management ownership companies than to
high management companies.  
Our findings from the Japanese financial markets are consistent with the
agency theory hypothesis, which is in agreement with prior studies, especially
those of Bhagat et al. (1985) and DeFusco et al. (1990) from the United States. 
It has been said that the structure of corporate governance in Japan is fair-
ly different from that in the United States.  Some financial studies, however,
show characteristics common to both systems, while others report their differ-
ences.  This  paper contributes to the  former  by illustrating  the similarities
between  Japan  and  the  US  in  stock  market  reaction  to  stock  option  plans
as  compensation  to  management.  While  differences  may  exist  in  the  cor-
porate governance  system,  the  data  and  the  analysis  show  that the  market
reaction  to  option-based  compensation  is  similar.
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